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Heather Menzies (2005) argues that Canadian democracy's present state is one oscillating between 
apathy and hysteria. The erosion of a democratic middle ground, for Menzies (2005), is directly 
related to the rise of an accelerated culture wherein citizens have no time to engage with one 
another. Menzies (2005) builds her argument on Robert Putnam's (2001) distinction between social 
bonding and social bridging. Bonding is a process of social reaffirmation between members of a fairly 
homogenous group while bridging involves dialogue amongst a collective of diverse interests 
(Putnam, 2001 ). The disappearance of bridging, combined with the increasing popularity of bonding, 
contributes to a widespread civic disengagement and the decline of community capital (Putnam, 
2001). Indicators of civic disengagement include decreased voter turnout, weakened community 
ties, lowered participation rates in grassroots organizations and the disappearance of public spaces 
(Menzies, 2005; Putnam, 2001). Putnam (2001) attributes these developments to a shift in the values 
held by younger generations. While Putnam meticulously details how civic engagement has 
declined, his analysis does not include consideration of how changes to popular ideology have 
contributed to- if not all together steered- the decline (Steger, 2002). 
This paper attempts to map the rise of neoliberalism - as political economic policy and related 
ideology- to provide the necessary context for Putnam's generational change thesis, examining the 
relationship between neoliberalism and civic disengagement. While Putnam's work focuses on 
American trends, this paper explores similar changes within a Canadian context. The components of 
civic engagement considered here include non-voting political activity, participation in elections, and 
participation in community activities. Neoliberalism refers to "a theory of political economic practices 
proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial 
freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, 





















the recognition that advancing the neoliberal project requires the continual increase in consumption 
demand, an increase which manifests through the acceleration of consumption practices and the 
creation of new markets (Harvey, 201 0). Focusing specifically on the development of information and 
communication technology (ICT) markets, this paper details how this industry exploded in the mid 
1970s (Dyer-Witheford, 1999) and has continued to expand since (Sciadas, 2006). 
ICTs not only symbolize a new market, but a critical component to understanding declining civic 
engagement. There appears to be a positive correlation between ICT use and perception of time-
poverty amongst users (Menzies, 2005; Sciadas, 2006). If poverty is defined as the condition of not 
having adequate resources to meet one's basic needs (A Dictionary of Sociology, 2009), time-
poverty is the condition of not having adequate time to meet these needs. Perceived-time-poverty is 
a subjective experience of time pressure that does not reflect an objective lack of time. While not 
based on a real time deficit, perceived-time-poverty has real world consequences for the individuals 
experiencing it (Gershuny, 2005). This paper explores these consequences and considers how this 
perception can contribute to civic disengagement. 
The effects of neoliberal ideology, ICT use, and perceived-time-poverty are then considered in 
relation to the online and civic activities of Generation C. Putnam (2001) identified that civic 
disengagement began with individuals born in the 1940, and increased amongst members of 
Generation X. If each generation demonstrates decreasing engagement, Canada's youth ages 15-30 
should demonstrate diminished interest in civic activity. This paper explores how discourses shaping 
the identity of Generation C normalize and celebrate the abandonment of traditional civic 





















To illustrate how the often complex relationships between neoliberal ideology, ICTs, perceived-time-
poverty, and Generation C manifest in popular discourse, three advertisements are discussed 
throughout this paper. As advertisements contribute to the shaping of individual's consent for, and 
understanding of, the neoliberal political economic system, it is necessary to examine the cultural role 
that commercials play (Jhally, 2000). This research originally focused specifically on the 
advertisements for Bell Mobility and Rogers Wireless- as the two nation-wide Internet and telephone 
service providers in Canada. Previous ads for both providers offered a more comprehensive narrative 
regarding the relationship between the individual, the technology, and the online social world. 
However, recent ads for Bell and Rogers have been reduced in their scope, focusing solely on the 
new phones each company offers (see Image One). The emphasis on technological fetishization 
inherent in these new ads likely represents the companies' response to the arrival of new service 
providers in Canada who are challenging the market's oligopolistic structure. To capture the 
narratives previously shared through these advertisements, an older Rogers advertisement is 
included in this discussion. The other ads examined are Kotex's interactive Ban the Bland campaign 
and Motorola Xoom's Empower the People television commercial. These advertisements were 
chosen as they are exemplary of advertisement's roles as a promoter of new markets, and celebrator 
of Generation C. 
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Bowling Alone explores a paradox in American society. Despite statistical documentation 
demonstrating that, in the last three decades of the 201h century, there was no decline in average 
amounts of leisure time for Americans, this population seemed to no longer have time for traditional 
civic engagement and social activities (Putnam, 2001 ). Examining a range of potential causes, 
Putnam (2001) concludes that generational change has created the growing "anticivic contagion" 
(p.24 7) responsible for the disengagement trend. While the baby boomer generation demonstrated 
declining interest in civic engagement, Putnam's (2001} research identifies that disengagement really 
took hold with Generation X. However, Putnam's unwillingness to consider the effects of changing 
political economic conditions on generational levels of civic participation limits his analysis (Steger, 
2002). While recognizing that "chronic financial anxiety, increased time pressure, and enhanced 
working hours ... partly account for declining social capital in America" (Steger, 2002, p.272) Putnam 
neglects to examine the overarching political economic ideology that affects all these factors. This 
paper aims to provide the political economic context for Putnam's generational change thesis, 
demonstrating the negative correlation between neoliberalism and civic engagement. 
Neoliberal reordering 
The social programs which define the Canadian welfare state - including medicare, the Canadian 
Pension Plan, and the Canadian Assistance Plan - developed out of a national push for equality in 
the 1960s and early 1970s (Osberg, 2008). At this time, poverty reduction was of such central 
concern for the Canadian and American governments that Lyndon Johnson declared war on poverty 
and the Canadian federal government produced a pivotal poverty-reduction report (Osberg, 2008). In 
this era of Keynesian economic policy, the state's role was that of a stabilizer and protector, 



















The economic crisis of "stagflation" in the 1970s challenged not only this role of the state, but also 
the Keynesian consensus which informed it. The economic experience of this decade shocked 
Keynesian economists not only because it signaled the first post-war recession, but because the 
combination of high unemployment and high inflation contradicted the widely accepted Phillips 
Curve. Developed in the 1960s, the Phillips Curve purportedly explained an inverse relationship 
between rates of inflation and unemployment (Malsberger & Marshall, 2009). As North American 
production slowed and inflation rose, this model's validity was refuted. The most significant 
challengers to this model, and Keynsianism as a whole, were Milton Friedman's Monetarism, Robert 
Lucas' Rational Expectations, and the Supply Side economic model that would inform the policies of 
both the Reagan and Thatcher administrations (Malsberger & Marshall, 2009). 
Supply side economics challenged two central tenets of Kenynesianism: its macro analysis of 
national economies, and its concern with stimulating aggregate demand (Harvey, 2001 ). As such, 
supply side policies focused on addressing the micro - or individual -decisions to work, save, and 
invest (Malsberger & Marshall, 2009). Under this model , taxes and government interventions were 
seen as disincentives that prevented individuals from fully participating in the economy. Reagan's 
economic plan included income tax cuts, the dismantling of regulatory bodies, deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry, and reductions of government spending to alleviate such disincentive 
(Harvey, 2001 ). The economic prosperity generated by these changes was not distributed amongst 
American citizens, or even shared with their government. At the end of Reagan 's presidency, the 
United States had its highest peacetime deficit while workers' wages had began to stagnate 
(Malsberger & Marshall, 2009). 
Canada's neoliberal turn soon followed America's. While aspects of the welfare state were reduced 




















commence until after the election of Brian Mulroney in 1984 (McBride & McNutt, 2007). The 
perceived logic inherent in the dismantling was reinforced by the two severe economic recessions in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Osberg, 2008). It is important to note that the neoliberal assault on Canadian 
social programs has been a much more gradual process than the American experience. Stephen 
McBride and Kathleen McNutt (2007) identify that Canadian governments, starting with the Mulroney 
cabinet, ushered in change using "techniques included transforming universal into selective 
programmes, tightening eligibility requirements, and imposing ceilings on programme costs or, 
alternatively, attempting to make programmes self-financing or subject to 'clawbacks' over a certain 
benefit level" (p.186). This gradual reduction of public services, combined with the long stagnation of 
wages created a (still) growing gap between Canada's lower and upper classes (Osberg, 2008). 
Increases in the median real income of Canadians ended in approximately 1979 (Osberg, 2008). 
From 1992 to 2004, the incomes for the top 5% of Canadians rose faster than all other incomes 
(Statistics Canada, 201Gb). Osberg (2008) notes that over this twelve year period, the top 5% 
experienced a 43.6% increase to their household incomes, equaling on average a gain of $55,000 (in 
2004 dollars). As a result, by 2008, the 20% of Canadians with the highest after-tax household 
incomes had, on average, an income 5.4 times higher than the lowest 20% (Statistics Canada, 
2010b). Despite this growing gap being antithetical to the self-identity of "Canada the good" as a 
socially democratic nation (Hackworth, 2009, Osberg, 2008), there has been little resistance to the 
advancement of the country's neoliberal project. It is possible that the slowed pace of the changes 
prevented Canadians from recognizing the extent of the damage. However, in the current decade 
when glaring inequalities have become apparent, continued acceptance contradicts Canada's self-
identity. 
Returning to the American neoliberal experience offers further clues to the lack of dissent against the 


















socially democratic than America's (Hackworth, 2009), the growing inequality inherent in the 
implementation of neoliberal economics even challenged previously held notions about the 
distribution of economic prosperity in the United States. As Frank (2000) explains, "in the decades 
after World War II, the distinguishing feature of American civilization was its great and evenly 
distributed wealth" (12). To understand how the citizenry transitioned (fairly) willingly into a new 
economic system wherein they shared a smaller piece of the prosperity requires examining what 
Comor (2008) describes as the third dimension of power, and how this power shapes conceptual 
systems. 
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Citing Lukes, Comor (2008) notes that understanding systems of power requires the consideration of 
three dimensions. While the first dimension understanding of power views a lack of quantifiable 
opposition as indicative of consent, the second dimension approach recognizes that the absence of 
dissent does not equal a contented citizenry but may be the result of conditions that prevent the 
airing of grievances. However, these approaches fail to explain "acquiescence in the face of 
demonstrable global disparities" such as those developing out of the adoption of neoliberal 
economic policies (Comor, 2008, p.20). The third dimension approach, then, recognizes that a lack 
of dissent is more likely related to "common sense norms that, in effect, deter or deny the capacity to 
resist. .. the absence of conflict may be the result of a form of power that shapes consciousness 
itself' (Comor, 2008, p.21, emphasis in original) . Third dimension power manifests through social 
mythologies and norms that, in turn, inform conceptual systems. 
According to Kamilla Pietrzyk (201 0), "conceptual systems can be defined as interrelated, 
interworking sets of values, ideas, and beliefs that shape every individual's worldview" (para 13). 
Informed by the reified, seemingly apolitical inputs of media, technology, organizations, and 
institutions, conceptual systems mediate an individual's understanding of what is possible, and 
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desirable (Comor, 2008) . Acquiescence to neoliberalism's systems of inequality was normalized and 
celebrated through the changing inputs which reconfigured popular conceptual systems for North 
Americans beginning in the 1970s (Frank, 2000). Harvey (2007) identifies that in the United States, 
"various threads of power intertwined to create [this] transition" to neoliberalism (p.29). The first step 
towards the "neoliberalism as common sense" discourse was the take over of Republican politics by 
corporate and financial powers in 1976 (Harvey, 2007). Followed closely by the combined with fiscal 
disciplining of government institutions and programs, these measures developed a neoliberal state, 
but still lacked a popular base of support (Harvey, 2007). 
The initial attempt to gain the citizenry's support for neoliberal change was a populist narrative 
developed in tandem with the rise of Reaganomics (Frank, 2000). Devoted to raging against the 
"liberal media" and "welfare queens", this narrative appealed to the anger of the working class (Frank, 
2000, p.26). This new mechanism for engaging blue collar voters, although popular, remained unable 
to capture popular support for neoliberalism. By the 1990s this narrative's allegiance to traditional 
values proved incapable of capturing the Gen X market, who resisted the discourse's moral outrage 
(Frank, 2000). The efforts of authors including Thomas Friedman, Kevin Kelly, Walter Wriston 
redirected the populist discourse away from traditional values to celebrating the market. Within this 
new discourse, welcoming neoliberal deregulation and globalization processes meant welcoming 
increased freedom for Americans (Frank, 2000). Books, television programs, and magazine articles 
came to proclaim that, 
By its very nature the market was democratic, perfectly expressing the popular will 
through the machinery of supply and demand ... In fact, the market was more 
democratic than any of the formal institutions of democracy- elections, legislatures, 
government (Frank, 2000, p.28). 





















was born. Through resultant discourses, individuals began to perceive of themselves as consumers, 
rather than citizens (Zizek, 2009). 
The power of market populism is in its ability to return to the citizenry their sense of agency which 
neoliberal restructuring has undercut. Of course, in the new world order, this agency is to be 
expressed through participation in the free market, not via traditional avenues of civic engagement 
(Frank, 2000). As a conceptual system, market populism not only limits resistance to neoliberal 
advancement, it also encourages individuals to abandon traditional methods of civic engagement in 
favour of consumption-centric demonstrations of agency. This is the ideological shift inherent in, but 
not identified by, Putnam's generational change thesis. Market populist discourse presents the 
citizenry with a permissive society. Zizek (2009) defines a permissive society as one in which 
individuals have an expanded scope of activities which they are allowed to perform without receiving 
any additional power. In the neoliberal society the expanded scope manifests through the array of 
consumption-based activities available to the citizenry. Any activities that seek to restore diminished 
power- such as that of organizing labour- or attempts to disrupt the global circulation of capital -
such as anti-globalization protests- however, are met with ruthless force (Zizek, 2009)). Thus, the 
generational change identified by Putnam is likely the result of individuals adopting a market populist 
conceptual system through which they self-identify as autonomous consumers, rather than members 
of an active community. 
The role of ICTs 
Recent developments in the ICT industry, including the purported dawn of an Information Age and 
related Knowledge Economy, have been central to maintaining and extending consent for the 
neoliberal project. As Graham (1999) argues, the knowledge economy "may be seen as less a 
technologically determined phenomenon and more a political economy of language, thought, and 
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technology" (p.485) through which inequalities are hidden and personal identity is commodified. The 
technologies of this age have become the symbolic weapons of market populist discourse, as their 
proliferation is promised to upend hierarchies of power, returning control to the common man (Frank, 
2000). Frank (2000) explains, "if the Web achieved anything ... it was in its final blurring of the line 
between the People and corporate America" (p.148). 
To suggest that ICTs play a crucial role in maintaining hegemonic order is not to suggest that this 
function is an inherent part of the technologies' designs. Here, it is important to consider the 
distinction Postman (2000) offers between a technology and a medium. "A technology is to a 
medium what the brain is to the mind. Like the brain, a technology is a physical apparatus. Like the 
mind, a medium is a use to which a physical apparatus is put" (Postman, 2000, p.47). Thus, the role 
that technologies play in advancing neoliberal objectives in North America represent how ICTs are 
employed as mediums within this environment. 
ICTs have been invaluable in advancing financialization (Dyer-Witheford, 1999). As Harvey (2001) 
notes, "information technology is the privileged technology of neoliberalism. It is far more useful for 
speculative activity and for maximizing the number of shortterm market contracts than for improving 
production" (p.159). Beyond encouraging a departure from production to speculation, ICTs have also 
provided the infrastructure required to reshape global labour. The mobility these technologies afford, 
combined with their ability to support real-time international communication foster the development 
of systems of flexible accumulation wherein corporations disperse the components of their 
production processes around the globe (Hearn, 2008). While the results of this process for the 
laboring classes "[are] lower wages, increasing job insecurity, and in many instances loss of benefits 
and of job protections" (Harvey, 2001, p. 76) for corporate heads, the process signals a powerful new 
option for extracting increased surplus value from processes of production. 
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The role of ICTs within the neoliberal project is not limited to supporting global circuits of capital. At 
the individual level, newly developed technologies have been marketed as essential life support 
systems. Comor (2008), quoting Ursula Huws, suggests "one way of summarizing the history of 
capitalism is to trace it as the gradual replacement of tasks performed communally and at home with 
things made by private interests for money" (p. 63). Certainly, the introduction and proliferation of 
personal communication technologies signals a milestone in this process. From the late 1970s 
forward, the personal communication technology market has become increasingly saturated with 
new essential additions and upgrades for the individual's technological arsenal (Dyer-Witheford, 
1999). Creating new markets for ICTs requires the privatization of previously public processes and 
spaces, as well as the commodification of the previously uncommodified. 
Sciadas' (2006) study of Canadians' spending patterns details how the increased use of ICTs has led 
to an increase in ICT spending, as individuals strive to keep up with the technological demands of 
their new activities. Preceding the rise in spending, Weisberg (2000) documents that, in the 1990s 
there was a significant increase in the number of technology ads on television. This rise can be seen 
as an input seeking to reshape the conceptual systems of Canadians to include the "common 
sense" idea that personaiiCTs are both necessary and desirable. Between 1997 and 2003, the 
average household spending on ICTs in Canada increased from $2118 to $2780 (Sciadas, 2006). 
ion. Sciadas (2006) notes that this increase "is remarkable as it happened over a period where ICT 
prices plummeted" (p.18). Computer prices fell 10% between 2002 and 2003 alone (Sciadas, 
2006).Thus, the increased spending is indicative of the purchasing of multiple new technologies to 
participate in digital culture, signaling participation in new markets. 
The rise of online spaces and their associated technologies has advanced the fetishization of 
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information. The fetishization of information echoes in texts which champion the rise of the 
Information Age as an age of great enlightenment - based on the faulty premise that access to 
information will translate fluidly into knowledge, knowledge into democracy, and so on (Dyer-
Witheford, 1 999; Mosco, 2004). However, "more information does not necessarily lead to more 
knowledge" (Comor, 2002, p.240). As Preston (2002) suggests, the promise of the Information Age, 
"rarely extends beyond the cul-de-sac of an information-consuming, but 'know-less society'" (p.234). 
While the amount of information available has increased exponentially in digital spaces, this 
information is intended primarily for consumption. As such, the constant stream of information 
available in digital spaces encourages users to develop an appetite for sustained content 
consumption, less than constant knowledge production. 
In addition to the fetishization of information, the digitization of social practices is central to their 
commodification (Mosco, 2002). Social networking sites playing a critical role in this process, 
although they were not created with the expressed purpose of assisting in the neoliberal project. 
Here, Castree's (2009) observation about clock time is instructive. "Clock time was not created by 
capitalism ... but it is assuredly central to this system's mode of operation" (p.39). Within the 
neoliberal economic system, social networking sites are used to create new markets through 
commodifying the relationships that they support. These spaces also facilitate the commodification 
of the self, and of social relationships. Hearn (2008) explains that the process of creating an online 
persona, and performing socially through this identity involves "a form of self-presentation singularly 
focused on attracting attention and acquiring cultural and monetary value" (p.213). Again returning to 
Putnam's generational change thesis, when individuals are focused on self-branding in the 
commodified social realm, civic engagement becomes a secondary concern unless it can be 






The advancement of the promotional self occurring within social networks not only creates potential 
new markets, but also does so in a way that addresses the needs of the current economy. Increasing 
resource scarcity threatens neoliberalism's impetus for continual growth (Harvey, 201 0). However, 
online social relations contribute to a larger digitization project which "expands the commodification 
of communication content by extending the range of opportunities to measure and monitor, package 
and repackage information and entertainment" (Mosco, 2002, p .261). The content which users 
create and share can be monitored by marketers to improve the effectiveness of their communication 
with target markets (Dyer-Witheford, 1999; Hearn, 2008 ). Increasingly, corporations are inviting 
individuals to donate their content. This process of content soliciting makes online communication 
with consumers quite lucrative for corporations, as free content can be packaged and sold with a 
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minimal input of socially necessary labour time (SNLT). SNLT is the time input "required to produce a 
commodity under the 'normal' conditions of production and with the 'average' degree of skill and 
intensity" (Castree, 2009, p.39). Profits are generated when the amount of SNLT required for 
production is reduced. The content generated in online spaces has excellent potential to support the 
extraction of surplus value by providing free inputs into the process of production. 
Rising perception of time poverty 
While claims of time loss rise (Abma, 201 0; Menzies, 2005), the amount of daily leisure time for 
Canadians has remained virtually constant for the past thirty years (Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada, 2010). As data from Human Resources and Skills Development Canada does 
not account for Canadian leisure levels prior to the neoliberal turn, the use value of this data set is 
limited for this discussion. Following the rise of neoliberal economic policy, the distribution of leisure 
time became increasingly uneven with the largest portions going to workers coerced into early 
retirement, with highly educated, high wage earners working longer hours (Comor, 2000). 
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From the available data, what is known is that trends of increasing perceptions of time-poverty, 
paired with a maintained or increased amount of leisure time have been documented in the United 
States (Putnam, 2001; Sullivan, 2008; Szollos, 2009), Australia (Goodin, Rice, Bittman, & Saunders, 
2004) and Britain (Burchardt, 201 0; Gershuny, 2005; Robinson & Godbey, 2005). The number of 
individuals reporting heightened perceptions of time-poverty have risen continually during the past 
thirty years (Szollos, 2009). Comparing survey responses from 1965 and 1992, Wajcman (2008) 
found that the percentage of 18-64 year old participants who reported always feeling rushed 
increased from 24 to 38 percent. 
Although perceptions of time-poverty are widespread, specific demographics are experiencing a 
time-poverty rooted in increased demands for time. These groups include single parents (Goodin et 
al., 2004), working mothers (Wajcman, 2008), and highly educated, high status individuals (Sullivan, 
2008) whom Gershuny (2005) has named "the superordinate working class" (p.290). Goodin et al. 
(2004) note that these demographics are less likely to experience perceived-time-poverty, while 
young adults without children are the most likely to report it. This conclusion is supported by the 
recent Harris Decima poll reporting that an increasing number of Canadians under the age of thirty-
five feel rushed and have increasingly less time to accomplish tasks (Abma, 2010, CNW Group, 
2010). 
Several conceptual models have been proposed to assist in separating experiences of perceived and 
real time-poverty. Szollos (2009) defines chronic time poverty as comprising an objective time 
shortage and a subjective feeling of being rushed. Goodin et al. (2004) distinguish between 
discretionary and free time: with the former equaling what is traditionally defined as leisure time, "time 
that is not allocated to either paid work, unpaid work, or personal care" (Statistics Canada, 2006, 
para 6.). Free time is then the time that is leftover for leisure activities, recognizing that individuals 
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frequently commit more time than required to their various forms of work (Goodin et al., 2004). The 
problem inherent in this model results from the "necessary time" values which Goodin et al. (2004) 
propose to define the appropriate amount of time allotted for each task- a problem that the authors 
recognize (Goodin, et al. 2004). While this study advances the much needed nuancing of leisure time 
definitions, the subjectivity inherent in ascribing "necessary" time to paid and unpaid work is 
problematic (Burchardt, 201 0). Realizing this, Burchardt (201 0) proposes an alternate conception 
whereby an individual's decisions regarding how to allocate time are seen as constrained by available 
resources and responsibilities. Thus, if an individual has a substantial amount of financial resources 
and few responsibilities, he can opt to enjoy increased amounts of leisure time while the individual 
with inadequate financial resources must commit her time to secure the wage required to afford her 
basic necessities (Burchardt, 201 0). This model is helpful for considering the role that neoliberal 
ideology plays in shaping perceptions of time-poverty through the individual's recognition of what 
constitutes a resource and a responsibility. 
In addition to these models, Wajcman (2008), citing Rosa, offers three categories for understanding 
how perceptions of time become accelerated: technological acceleration, acceleration of social 
change, and the pace of life. Technological acceleration refers to the increasing speed with which 
one can accomplish tasks, such as communicating with ICTs (Wajcman, 2008) . Accelerating social 
change includes reducing the institutional stability of one's family, community, and employment 
(Wajcman, 2008). Finally, accelerating pace of life involves the speeding up of the creation and 
distribution of cultural texts and the completion of tasks (Wajcman, 2008). An accelerated culture is 
one wherein technological acceleration and growing time scarcity occur simultaneously (Wajcman, 
2008). The previously discussed explosion of the ICT market is indicative of technological 
acceleration. In a neoliberal society, where social security has been substantially eroded, social 
stability is radically reduced. So how has the pace of life accelerated to create an accelerated culture, 
and and how does this culture affect perceptions of time-poverty? 
Perceptions of time are altered by the blurring of boundaries between personal and public life 
(Graham, 1999). As technologies from email to Blackberry Messaging increase the ability to 
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communicate with one another continuously, regardless of time or distance, so too increases the 
expectation for immediate responses (Menzies, 2005). In the wired landscape, there is no such thing 
as time off. With the demand for constant communication, the labour inherent in these processes 
can quickly devour the discretionary time that was previously relegated for leisure. Further, constant 
communication fractures leisure time, which can lead to the perception that the total amount of time 
available is diminished (Wajcman, 2008). Robinson and Godbey (2005) suggest that the 
commodification of leisure practices in the digital landscapes increase perceptions of time-poverty as 
personal leisure becomes a publicly performed act of consumption. The consumption imperative 
inherent in leisure time within digital landscapes overwhelms one's sense of free time (Robinson & 
Godbey, 2005). 
As technological saturation and expectations for individuals to communicate continuously have 
increased, the practice of multitasking has become a necessary survival mechanism. The percentage 
of individuals reporting that they multitask "most of the time" increased from 37% in 1975 to 55% in 
2001 (Robinson & Godbey, 2005, p.421). Kenyon's (2008) study identifies that up to 95% of the 
population multitasks for one-third of the day, and that this amount increases with time spent online. 
Using time-diary data to capture the practice of performing two or more activities simultaneously, 
Kenyon (2008) estimates that "multitasking 'adds' on average more than seven hours to each day, 
totaling an addition of more than 50 hours to the average week" (p.303). This equals a 45% increase 








The performance of multiple tasks simultaneously impacts both perceived-time-poverty and 
participation in civic activities. Multitasking creates a new temporal experience of time density 
(Sullivan, 2008). This increased temporal density is exhausting, and can require individuals to 
disengage during their leisure time as a result (Wajcman, 2008). Kenyon (2008) notes successful 
multitasking is possible only with activities which demand less cognitive processing and attention. 
Social activities can be multitasked fairly easily while engaging with a complex problem is less 
conducive to this practice (Kenyon, 2008). Civic activities, such as engaging with nuanced social 
issues, or policy recommendations, lose favour with the multitasking masses as they cannot be 
performed simultaneously with other tasks. 
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Beyond considerations of multitasking, Gershuny (2005) and Sullivan (2008) suggest that perceived-
time-poverty is, in fact, a social performance which seeks to assert status. The lengthening work day 
of the upper class has created a superordinate working class (Gershuny, 2005). This increased time 
demand for the affluent reshapes the "common sense" understanding of how time ought to be 
spent. Considering the celebration of billionaires in market populist discourses, and the related notion 
of the market as a meritocracy (Frank, 2000), perceived-time-poverty as performance becomes a 
plausible explanation for the rising reports of busyness. Further, Sullivan (2008) suggests that the 
performance of busyness extends beyond work time to leisure time. Individuals are increasing the 
density of their leisure experience, demonstrating a preoccupation with increasing the quantitative 
amount of leisure compressed into each experience, a '"voraciousness' of cultural consumption" 
(Sullivan, 2008, p.15). 
, The densification of leisure time, multitasking, and perceptions of accelerated culture play critical 
roles in persuading consumers to accelerate their consumption patterns. Without accelerated 
1 
I 
consumption, there is a crisis of production with the amount of goods produced exceeding the 
demand, thereby diminishing rates of profit return (Comor, 2008). As such, the new economy 
requires restless consumers with insatiable appetites for content and products alike. 
The Rogers Wireless $10,000 Question commercial demonstrates how this imperative is 
communicated . In this spot, a promotional team is walking through the stands at a soccer game. 
The team poses a "$1 0,000 question" to the crowd (Image 2), which the first male character 
attempts to answer using his smart-phone to find the necessary information (Image 3) . When his 
Internet connection drops (Image 4), the second character shouts out the answer. He then stands 
up, smart-phone raised in victory overhead as the crowd applauds (Image 5). While one is more 
successful than the other, both of the ad's central characters are demonstrating their unending 
connectivity. Even while acting as spectators at a soccer game, the men are using their smart-
phones to remain connected to the Internet. As such, they are multitasking as needed, densifying 
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their leisure time. There is also an allegorical tale here, regarding a failure to maintain connectivity and 
the crucial need for speed as the second character manages to best the first with his fast, constant 
Internet connectivity. Reaffirming Gershuny (2005) and Sullivan's (2008) suspicion, the man who 






(CanadaAds, 201 0) 
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Generation C 
In 2004, Trendwatching.com announced that they had discovered a new generation: Generation C 
(Kalmus, Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, Runnel, Siibak, 2009). Since their unveiling,this new generation has 
been celebrated by marketers with an optimism that echoes the promises of connectivity made at 
the dawn of the Information Age (see Frank, 2000; Mosco, 2004). According to the enthusiasts at 
Booz & Company (2010), 
As they grow up, this highly connected generation will live "online" most of their 
waking hours, comfortably participate in social networks with several hundred or more 
contacts, generate and consume vast amounts of formerly private information, and 
carry with them a sophisticated "personal cloud" that identifies them in the converged 
online and offline worlds (p .1). 
Reviewing the available documentation about Generation C raises questions regarding the 
generation's attributes and authenticity. First, who is and is not a member of Generation Cremains 
unclear. Trendwatching.com (2004, 2007) describes this group as not belonging to any one age 
cohort, a sentiment shared by Dye (2007) as she reports to her readers that Generation C, "they're 
you (and me)" (p .38). Other authors are more committed to the notion of age cohorts, defining 
Generation C as 21 and under (Booz & Company, 201 0), 11 -18 (Kalmus et al., 2009), or 13-29 
(Nielsenwire, 201 Od). 
The lack of a working definition for this generation extends to the meaning of the "C". Originally, 
Trendwatching.com (2004) declared that it stood for "content". In 2007, however, they changed their 
position, and proposed that this was Generation Cash (Trendwatching.com, 2007). Beyond these 
suggestions, just about every word beginning with c that has a positive connotation has been 
suggested, including: connect, communicate, and change (Booz & Company, 201 0); content, 
creation, and creativity (Kalmus et al., 2009); creators and consumers (Dye, 2007); with the broadest 
suggestion coming from Dan Pankraz of DDB Sydney. In a speech at Nielsen's Consumer 360 
conference, Pankraz told his audience that the c stood for "constant connectivity, collaboration, 
change, co-creation, chameleons, cyborgs, curiosity. But most of all, Gen Cis the 'Connected 
Collective' consumer," (Nielsenwire, 201 Od, para. 2) . 
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Pankraz's comments illustrate a pivotal point about this purported generation. Above all, marketers 
celebrate this group for their capability to create content and consume avidly. Generation C promises 
to realize Toffler's (1970) vision of the prosumer, intertwining practices of production and 
consumption. This is clearly the reason why marketers developed the notion of Generation C, as it is 
a mechanism for the market to define a generation and promote this identity back to the generation's 
members. Moreover, this process of naming has allowed marketers to ascribe market-friendly 
attributes onto this group: specifically their eagerness to create content- thereby reducing the 
socially necessary labour time inputs into commodities sold to this demographic - as well as 
demonstrating the previously mentioned "voraciousness" of cultural consumption (Sullivan, 2008, 
p.15). The discourses detailing Generation C's behaviours not only articulate technological 
optimism, but reinforce market populism: the avenues of agency open to this group are based in 
consumption, the new version of civic engagement. 
Celebrations of the creative capacities of this group are harnessed in "democratic" content creation 
campaigns which encourage youth to create content for corporations as an exercise of personal 
empowerment and polit ical engagement. A recent example of this is Kotex's Ban the Bland 
campaign (Image 6). By contributing designs to Kotex for their line of feminine hygiene products, 
"you can make your mark on feminine care and the world around you" (KCWW, 2010, para. 2) . Kotex 
continues its rallying cry by declaring that the time has come for women to be liberated from a 
culture that shies away from talking about sexual health (KCWW, 201 0). There is an irony worth 
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noting here that a company which peddles its menstrual products with the more pleasant 
euphemism "feminine protection" has taken up this fight for frankness. Not surprisingly, the promised 
change that Kotex uses to engage young women in content creation has less to do with advancing a 
feminist agenda, and much more to do with advancing profits. 
Positioning products with higher ideals is certainly not a new mechanism for generating sales. Jhally 
(2000) identifies that, beginning in the 1920s, advertising "started to connect commodities ... with the 
powerful images of a deeply desired social life the people said they wanted" (31). Generation C-
directed campaigns reaffirm the conceptual frame of market populism, but also massage the 
audience's self-identity to incorporate aspects of the Generation C identity. As Pricewaterhouse 
Cooper (2011 b) explains, "companies need to anticipate, identify and provide what consumers want 
- or what consumers will realize they want once they experience it" (p.1). Kotex's audience is 
encouraged to self-identify as subscribing to the Generation C conceptual system by recognizing the 
empowerment inherent in contributing free content to a corporate advertising campaign. Moreover, 
the audience can agree to participation recognizing that they have something unique to share. There 
is very much a celebration of the atomized actor connected to a community of atomized actors 
through the benevolent corporation inherent in the Ban the Bland campaign. As a result, this 
campaign not only celebrates notions of Generation C as creative content contributors, but also as 
individuals who understand communication and civic engagement as computer- and corporation-
mediated activities. 
The rise of Generation C is not responsible for the decline of civic engagement amongst young 
Canadians. Rather, it symbolizes the advancement of a market populist conceptual system which 
directs individuals away from the public realm of civic engagement to the private realm of 















emancipatory narratives of the Information Age and market populism while accelerating perceptions 
of time for members of the generation. Through cultural texts including advertising, Generation C's 
notions of being continuously plugged in and multitasking are normalized. Both the Kotex and 
Rogers campaigns base their narratives on an unnamed premise. Rogers assumes their audience 
shared the experience of the need for continual connectivity while Kotex assumes the recognition 
that new is best, allowing the audience to abandon traditional forms of civic engagement to seek 
empowerment through creating free content. By not naming the perceived need for continual 
connection, and the desire to employ new avenues of engagement, these ads relegate such notions 






















Make Your Mark on the Future of Feminine Protection 
You can help color the ('lain whlti! world of period products. Share your vision w1tn us and you could be one of three gi ris 
who wtll ... in a cha~ to wort~: with Patricia f"ifid. 
£Nn,_ TMI CHAL.LENOI ~ 




Generation C by numbers 
While marketers profess to have a nuanced understanding of Generation C, there is little statistical 
information available to substantiate these suppositions. The lack of definition regarding who 
comprises this generation certainly limits the ability of researchers to assess the accuracy of 
Generation C's constructed identity. In Canada, the only comprehensive documentation of this group 
is a 2009 study from the Centre francophone d'informatisation des organisations (CEFRIO). With the 
stated aim of providing a better description of the generation, their uses of technology, and the 
affects of this use on their world view, CEFRIO surveyed 2020 youths aged 12-24 via phone and 
Internet. Data collected from the 65 question survey was then compared against findings from 
Statistics Canada, NETendances, and lpsos Reid (Rejean, 2009). Additionally, CEFRIO conducted 
five discussion groups after the survey to augment their findings with qualitative interviews. Based in 
' Montreal, Quebec City, and Ottawa, these discussions involved 52 participants aged 16-24 (Rejean, 
2009). 
CEFRIO's data, when contrasted against the NETendances report's measurement of levels of ICT 
use amongst all Quebec residents, identifies that youth are the heaviest ICT using demographic in 
the province (Rejean, 2009). CEFRIO also documents an increase in the amount of time spent online 
by this demographic, from 13 hours per week, as previously identified by lpsos Reid , to 16 hours per 
week (Rejean, 2009). Respondents aged 18-24 were more likely to be heavy Internet users. 40% 
reported spending more 21 hours or more per week online, compared with 25% of 12-17 year old 
respondents (Rejean, 2009). Aside from recording a spike in usage, which Rejean (2009) attributes 
to a continual trend of increasing time spent online, Quebec's Generation C members' behaviours 
resemble behaviours of members elsewhere. 





the Internet to communicate with friends, find entertainment, and search for information. 
Respondents reported using the Internet to chat (74%), listen to and download music (72%), and 
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participate in social networking sites (51%) (Rejean, 2009). As such, "au Quebec comme ailleurs, les 
spectateurs sont plus nombreux que les createurs" (Rejean, 2009, p.9). The most popular content 
creation process respondents reported doing in the previous month was writing a blog (19%), 
followed by uploading photos (13%), and uploading video (12%) (Rejean, 2009). The propensity to 
create content increases with time spent online, as 24% of heavy users- individuals who spend 
more than 21 hours per week online- had personal blogs, compared with 14% of light users-
individuals who spend ten hours or less per week online (Rejean, 2009). Still, even content creation 
levels amongst heavy users are not indicative of a generation preoccupied with creation. 
CEFAlO's study included interviews with marketers (Rejean, 2009). These interviews further explain 
the impetus behind campaigns like Ban the Bland. Marketers recognize the importance of 
connecting with this generation to increase revenues. Drawing on ancient philosophy, agence BW 
president, Justin Kingsley explains the importance of interactive, content-generating advertising. 
"Confucius disait: "Dis-moi et j'oublierai; montre-moi, je me souviendrai; implique-moi et je 
comprendrai. En marketing, cela s'applique quand on veut rejoindre les jeune" (Rejean, 2009, p.21). 
The push to engage youth in content creation has benefits beyond reducing the corporation's inputs 
of SNLT. Only 49% of CEFAlO's respondents ages 16-24 had purchased a product online in the 
three months prior to the survey. Amongst heavy users, however, this percentage increased to 58. 
Rejean (2009) identifies two factors which influence online consumption patterns: the belief that 
consuming online is more economical, and the amount of time spent online, with heavy users more 
willing to participate. If content creation increases individual's time online, it may be able to increase 
their consumption. 
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Social networking sites have a specialized role in increasing online consumption for Generation C. 
Despite using the Internet to search for product information, the most influential factor affecting 
Generation C's purchase decisions is friends and family (Rejean, 2009). Marketers recognize the 
need to penetrate these social ties, believing that viral marketing campaigns represent a successful 
option to reach this end. As marketer Seth Rodin explains, "allumez l'enticelle qui enflammera les 
reseaux de consommateurs, 6tez-vous du chemin et laissez-Iss discuter entre eux" (Rejean, 2009, p. 
26). Designing advertisement content which can be easily shared via social networking sites allows 
for these discussions to begin, connecting the influence of family and friends to products. 
While participation in online consumer behaviour is on the rise, Generation C's participation in 
traditional realms of civic engagement continues to decline. 46% of CEFRIO respondents do not vote 
consistently (Rejean, 2009). Despite celebrations of the Internet as a new political forum, 46% of 
female and 34% of male CEFRIO respondents reported never using the Internet to give their opinion 
on social or political questions. How they did direct their political energy was through signing online 
petitions and evaluating their consumption choices. 56% of discussion group participants had signed 
an Internet-based petition while 52% reported choosing products based on companies' stated 
commitments to addressing social issues (Rejean, 2009) . Beyond these activities, 58% of youth 
reported not participating in any causes, universal or local in scope (Rejean, 2009). 
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Evaluating CEFRIO 
Considering the positive correlation between time spent online, content creation, and consumption, 
explains marketers' celebration of the idea of Generation C as constantly connected co-creating 
chameleons (Nielsenwire, 2010d) . Moreover, increasing individual's self-recognition within the identity 
of Generation C increases their likelihood of consuming online and creating free content. The notion 
proposed by Booz & Company (201 0) that member of Generation C carry a primary digital device 
which keeps them wired into online networks 24 hours a day is less based in reality, and more based 
in the market developing new ways to secure future growth. Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2010b) 
report that increasing the customer engagement experience increases the consumer's willingness to 
pay for content. While waiting for Generation C to become more fully integrated into online spaces, 
marketers have already redirected their online advertising budgets to target youth where they 
congregate in social networking and photo uploading sites. Comscore (2011 a) recorded a 15.6 
billion increase in number of advertising impressions achieved through social networking sites, and 
11 .1 billion for photo sharing sites. As a result, advertisers are investing more money into promotions 
on these sites (Comscore,2011 a) . 
Comparing CEFAlO's study with other Canadian research assists in developing a clearer image of 
Generation C. While there are disagreements about who is included in the generation, various 
statistics mapping the behaviours and attitudes of Canadians ages 12-34 are considered in this 
paper. The rise of time spent online by Generation C members identified in CEFRIO's study matches 
data recently released by Comscore (2011 a) showing that Canadians as a whole spent more time 
online and had more Internet visits per quarter than any other nationality. The increased participation 
in online activity has occurred in all income brackets (ComScore, 2011a). 


















amongst Canadians ages 34 and younger (Statistics Canada, 201 Oc). The percentage of young 
Canadians who accessed the Internet from any location- including home, school, and the library-
increased from 88.9% in 2005 to 93.1% in 2007 to 96.5% in 2009 (Statistics Canada, 201 Oc). The 
length of time spent online has also increased. In 2005, 72.6% of the young Canadians online used 
the Internet for personal use at least once per day (Statistics Canada, 201 Oc). By 2009, this 
percentage had increased to 82.9% (Statistics Canada, 201 Oc). 
While there have been significant changes to the number of Canadians online, and the amount of 
time they spend online, their online practices have not changed substantially in recent years. Email 
remains the most common online activity for Canadians in 2009 according to that year's Canadian 
Internet Use Survey (Statistics Canada, 201 Oc, Comscore, 2011 a) . Contrasting the lower content 
creation participation reported by CEFRIO, 45% of Canadian Internet Use Survey (CIUS) respondents 
under the age of 30 reported "contribut[ing] content or to participate in discussion groups (blogging, 
message boards, posting images)" in the past twelve months (Statistics Canada, 2010, p.14) . This is 
an increase over the 33.6% of 16-34 year old respondents in the 2007 CIUS who reported 
contributing content (Veenhof et al., 2008). However, the discrepancy between CIUS's and CEFRIO's 
statistics could be explained by the increased time-frame provided CIUS respondents- twelve 
months rather than CEFRIO's three months. There is further discrepancy between the percentage 
cited by Kalmus et al. (2009) and CEFRIO's statistic, with the former arguing that 64% of youth aged 
12-17 are engaged in content creation. Dye (2007) suggests that the percentage is between 33-50% 
for American teenagers. lpsos Reid's (2009) Interactive Report for the first quarter of 2009 reports 
that 31% of Canadians between the ages 18-34 uploaded videos in the previous three months, while 
46% reported both playing online games and participating in online discussions. The variance of 





















The declines in voting identified by CEFRIO are indicative of a larger trend. Despite 55.9% of youth 
18-24 reporting that they voted in the last federal election (Statistics Canada, 2011 ), data collected 
by Elections Canada (n.d.) reports much lower turnout. Young voter turn out was 37% in 2004, 
43.8% in 2006, and 37.4% in 2008's federal election (Elections Canada, n.d.). In fact, "since 1984, 
estimated voter turn out of the two youngest cohorts has been lower than all other age cohorts" 
(Barnes, 2010, p.5). Blais and Loewen (2011) identify that this trend is not limited to Canada, but has 
also been documented in the United States, Britain, and Finland. Voter participation generally 
increases with age- a process known as the lifecycle effect (Barnes, 201 0). An historical analysis of 
voter trends amongst younger Canadian cohorts, however, demonstrates a diminishing lifecycle 
effect wherein voter participation with these groups never rises substantially (Barnes, 201 0). 
Changes to patterns of non-voting civic participation are less clear than the voting decline. This is 
largely due to the definition used to measure this type of participation. Most analyses of non-voting 
civic participation in Canada are based on data from Statistics Canada's General Social Survey 
(GSS). To gauge levels of non-voting civic activities, the GSS asks respondents to select all activities 
they have participated in during the previous year. The activities listed are: following the news daily; 
searching for information on a political issue; writing to a newspaper or politician to express an 
opinion; joining a political party; volunteering with a political party; signing a petition; boycotting a 
product; attending a public meeting; speaking at a public meeting; and participating in a protest or 
march (Milan, 2005). Focusing on searching for political information, contacting a paper or politician; 
volunteering for and/or joining a political party, Keown (2007) recorded the frequency of these 
activities amongst GSS respondents, sorting the results into age brackets. When considering the 
weight of these actions as equal, Keown (2007) identified that Canadians between the ages of 19-24 
are 1.2 times more likely to participate in non-voting civic activities than citizens ages 45-64. Using 
the same GSS data, Milan's (2005) study breaks down participation in various activities by age to 
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The most popular forms of non-voting civic activity for Canadians between ages 15-2g in this data 
set are searching for political information, following the news and signing petitions (Milan, 2005) . The 
31 percentage point difference between the 15-21 and 30-44 age brackets, however, suggests that 
following the news may be falling out of favour with younger cohorts. Milan's (2005) sorting of activity 
popularity by age bracket is helpful for identifying which types of activity are becoming less popular. 
Regrettably, the latter half of Milan's (2005) study is devoted to counting how many non-voting 
activities members of the various brackets reported completing in the year prior to the 2003 GSS. 
This analysis is confused by ascribing equal weight to the various tasks. While reporting that more 
than half of young adults completed one activity, with 35% reporting participation in two to four 
activities (Milan, 2005) does not indicate the level of participation of these individuals. The variation of 
level of commitment between a young adult who signs an online petition and one who does not is 
likely not that significant. As a result, the analyses of GSS data regarding the political involvement of 
young Canadians does not contribute much to the discussion of changing levels of engagement. 
The rise of ethical consumption identified by CEFRIO and explored by Turcotte does offer some 
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exploration into how the non-voting civic activities of Canadians are changing. Turcotte (201 0) notes 
that from the mid 1970s to 2000s, boycotting was the form of non-traditional political participation 
with the biggest growth. Participation in this activity was informed by household income, as 44% of 
individuals with after-tax household incomes exceeding $100,000 choosing to boycott products, 
compared with 24% of individuals with incomes between $40,000-59,000 (Turcotte, 201 0). This form 
of political action is associated with what Turcotte (201 0) calls "post-materialist values" (p.22). These 
values centre around self-expression, with emphasis on autonomy, quality of life, and rebelling 
against political authority (Turcotte, 2010). What Turcotte identifies as post-materialist mirrors the 
values Frank (2000) recognizes as central to market populism. As such, the increase of ethical 
consumption should be seen as an extension of the conceptual system that encourages citizens to 
demonstrate their political opinion through market participation. The effectiveness of this conceptual 
system to inform behaviour is apparently on the rise with Generation C whose self-reported 
behaviours in CEFRIO demonstrate an increase over behaviours previously recorded by the GSS. 
While it is possible to document ethical consumption behaviours, time series measures of 
volunteerism are unusable for this investigation due to compulsory community service initiatives. 
Starting in Ontario in 1999, followed by British Columbia, the Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, 
and Newfoundland and Labrador, high school students have been mandated to complete a set 
amount of community service in order to graduate (The Current, 201 0). As a result, volunteer 
numbers for the younger half of Canada's Generation C cannot speak to a withdrawal from 
community participation. However, this legislating of mandatory service suggests that government 
officials may be aware of a decline in self-directed participation. 
Beyond these problematic data sets, the analyses of Veenhof (2006), and Turcotte (2007) offer a 
statistical starting point for understanding the relationship between increased time online and 
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decreased civic participation. Veenhof's (2006) analysis of GSS data related to Internet use and 
community involvement identifies a negative correlation between time spent online with amounts of 
time spent sleeping, working, watching television, and socializing. Most notably, Internet users who 
spent more than one hour online daily spent an additional 119 minutes alone per day (Veenhof, 
2006). There was also a negative correlation between weekend use of the Internet and time spent 
with friends (Veenhof, 2006). 
Analyzing four GSS cycles which focused on time use, Turcotte (2007) details changes in time spent 
with family between 1986-2005. In 1986, workers engaged in activities with their family members for 
an average of 4.2 hours daily (Turcotte, 2007). By 2005, this average decreased by 45 minutes to 3.4 
hours (Turcotte, 2007). The percentage of workers who spent one hour or less with their family per 
workday increased from 9% in 1986 to 14% in 2005 (Turcotte, 2007). The amount of time that 
workers spent with friends also declined from 44 to 19 minutes, while time alone increased 
continuously from 2.2 to 2.9 hours per workday (Turcotte, 2007). Turcotte (2007) attributes these 
changes, in part, to the rise in eating meals and watching television alone - activities which were 
previously shared with the family. Despite these changes, 33% of workers "reported in 2005 that they 
would like to spend more time alone" (Turcotte, 2007, p.2). 
Currently, there are no detailed data sets available with which to assess the level of perceived-time-
poverty amongst Generation C. A recent Harris Decima poll reported that an increasing number of 
Canadians under the age of thirty-five feel rushed and have increasingly less time to accomplish 
tasks (Abma, 2010, CNW Group, 201 0). Additionally, Goodin et al. 's (2004) study of perceived-time-
poverty differences between demographics identified that younger adults without children had the 




















instructive to consider that Pankraz claims that members of Generation C consume an estimated 
average of 13 hours of content per day (Nielsenwire, 201 Od). Such avid consumption requires 
equally avid multitasking. If multitasking leads to perceived-time-poverty, as Sullivan argues (2008), 
this likely explains the heightened perception of time-poverty amongst younger adults, including 
members of Generation C (Goodin et al. , 2004). 
Methodological Considerations 
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Attempts to pinpoint levels of content creation amongst members of Generation C has proven 
difficult, as demonstrated by the variation in percentages reported. There are two important things to 
consider regarding this challenge. First, just as there is no working definition of who is included in 
Generation C, there is no universal definition employed when measuring content creation. Various 
researchers have included posting on blogs, uploading videos, sharing pictures, participating in 
online forums and playing games. However, there is no gauge here to ascertain whether any of these 
activities is generating content in a normative sense which is implied in Generation C's narrative. 
Rather than creating packets of information to share with other individuals online, it seems more likely 
that what is being measured by this question of content creation is how much of a digital trail from 
which marketers can extract data young users are generating. For example, the inclusion of 
uploading photos in the definition of content creation immediately skews the results. Any person who 
is active on Facebook- including 85.6% of Canadian Internet users (Comscore, 2011 b) - is likely to 
have uploaded at least one profile picture. It is problematic to consider the performance of self-
branding inherent in the uploading of photos to such spaces as creating content when it is really 
more a social performance. As such, any definition of content creation that includes uploading 





















Inaccuracy is furthered by the time-frames for which members of Generation C are expected to 
report their content creation. The twelve month time frame used by CIUS is so large that it increase 
the likelihood of participants overestimating participation levels (Gershuny, 2005; Robinson & 
Godbey, 2005). Robinson and Godbey (2005) argue that the only way to capture accurate data 
about online behaviours is through time diaries in which respondents document all of their activities in 
a 24 hour period. Such a research method also prevents the skewing of data by one time 
participation in content creation activities. 
The ability to map a decline in civic participation in Canada is limited by the GSS' definition of non-
voting civic participation, and how the related data has been analyzed by Keown (2007) and Milan 
(2005) . Signing a petition online requires virtually no commitment while speaking at a public meeting 
or volunteering with a political party demonstrate much higher commitment. As such, these activities 
can not be grouped within the same GSS question. 
Similarly, time use studies conducted by Statistics Canada should adopt Kenyon's (2008) 
methodological mechanisms for capturing multitasking data. As multitasking becomes increasingly 
common, data that does not document this behaviour will be an invalid representation of time use. 
For documenting perceptions of accelerated time, Szollos (2009) recommends replacing survey 
collection methods with time-diaries to increase accuracy of activity reporting. Adding beeper 
interviews - where respondents are paged to record their feelings at random intervals - allows for 





















Returning to Putnam 
The fracturing of the media landscape into self-selected pockets of content has potentially 
decreased the political literacy of Generation C, and thus their level of engagement. As this group 
can opt to avoid or minimize exposure to political information, Blais and Loewen (2011) believe it is 
likely that this erasure reduces the ability of youth to navigate political discourses. Considering 
Kenyon's (2008) discovery that tasks which demand increased cognitive processing and attention 
are less likely to be multitasked, the multitasking Generation Cis likely to avoid political media in 
favour of media with a lighter cognitive load. 
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It is also worth noting that declines in youth voting in Canada began in 1984, during the ascent 
neoliberalism and market populism. Similarly, the countries identified by Blais and Loewen (2011) as 
having experienced declines in young voter turnout have adopted neoliberal political economic 
systems- a connection which the authors note as a possible influence on the decline. While Frank 
(2000) accounts for the prevalence of market populist discourse in America, this paper is unable to 
account for the existence of such discourses in Britain and Finland. Blais and Loewen's (2011) report 
that Canadian youth are "less likely to construe voting as a civic duty" (p.16) echoes the market 
populist propensity for replacing collective democratic activity with individual consumption-centric 
actions (Frank, 2000). However, the ability to connect the rise of neoliberalism with the fall of civic 
participation is limited by a lack of longitudinal, and attitudinal data {Blais & Loewen, 2011). 
Despite this lack of data, the discourse persuading young adults to adopt the individualistic path of 
consumption is aptly documented in the recent advertisement, Empower the People, for Motorola's 
(2011) Xoom tablet. Drawing on the dystopian themes explored in Apple's famous 1984 ad, 
Motorola's narrative takes a noticeably different turn. In the Apple commercial, one individual 
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liberates the masses from tyranny - symbolizing the optimism inherent in the Information Age 
discourses of the time. The arrival of the personal computer promised to liberate the masses by 
connecting them with knowledge (Mosco, 2004). Motorola's advertisement, by contrast, focuses on 
individual gain. The commercial begins with a scene of a young man waiting on a subway platform 
(Image 7). None too subtly, he is reading George Orwell's 1984 on his Motorola Xoom (Image 8). 
While the young man is wearing a gray sweater and black pants, everyone else in the ad is wearing a 
white jumpsuit, complete with white headphones- a reference to Apple's iPod. After taking the 
train, the young man uses his Xoom to find a florist. He then returns to the train where his love 
interest, a young woman wearing the white uniform of the masses, appears. In their shared office 
building, he pines for her from his glass cubicle. Again making use of his Xoom tablet, the 
protagonist takes a photo of the bouquet of flowers he has purchased. He then imports this picture 
into an animation software, with which he creates a short cartoon of a boy giving a girl a bouquet 
(Image 9). This animation is then transmitted to the Xoom tablet in the woman's glass cubicle. She 
watches it (Image 1 0), then looks up to see the young man holding the bouquet. She removes her 
(iPod) ear buds with a look of wonder (Image 11). The commercial ends with these white words 
displayed on the black background of a Xoom screen: "the tablet to create a better world" 
(Motorola. com, 2011 ). 
This advertisement includes many of the elements of both market populism's and Generation C's 
narratives. Most notably, the protagonist is living in constant connectivity, with all of his activities 
assisted by technology, specifically his Xoom tablet. The masses in this commercial realize Pankraz's 
vision of Generation C as cyborgs - as everyone is wired in with their ear buds The protagonist is 
celebrated for his uniqueness, represented through his attributes including his alertness, his manner 
of dress, the plants in his cubicle. Moreover, his reading of 1984 and rebellion against the white 





















discourse (Frank, 2000). The young man's ability to create an animation demonstrates his prowess 
with content creation, the primary activity of Generation C according to marketing legend 
(Trendwatching.com, 2004). The protagonist decides that the monotonous drone of modern life is 
not for him, indicating his desire to create change. Here is where Motorola's story diverges from 
Apple's. The Xoom hero has no interest in liberating the masses. Rather, he is interested in liberating 
himself and his love interest. While this flies in the face of Pankraz's claim that Generation C thinks as 
a collective (Nielsenwire, 201 Od), it represents the emphasis on individuality inherent in market 
populism's narrative. The liberation achievable through the market is an individual reward, not a 
collective one (Frank, 2000). Suggesting that the tablet is a tool for improving the world reaffirms both 
the notion that Generation C's content creation, and the consumption of new products are the 
appropriate avenues for realizing change within a neoliberal society. In sum, this piece demonstrates 
how advertising reaffirms conceptual systems and attempts to sway the behaviours of Generation C. 
There is a second element of the Motorola ad that deserves consideration. The use of white 
headphones speaks to the atomization that iPods have created. Bull (2005) explains that the use of 
an iPod creates "technologically mediated private realm[s]" within public space (p.354). While Bull 
(2005) reports iPod users cherishing the ability to carry a private realm with them, Motorola taps into 
the resultant alienation in their sales pitch. Linking modern alienation with from iPod use, Motorola 
demonstrates their tablet as providing a means to break out of this atomized existence. As such, the 
proliferation of one leisure technology has created a market for a new technology to mitigate the 
former's unintended consequences. While promising to empower users "to create a better world" it 














































Conclusion: Forgetting what democracy looks like 
Inherent to the functioning of an accelerated capitalist system, and market populism, is the 
preference for the new, and disdain for the old. Democratic processes have not been exempt from 
this valuation. The Canadian Policy Research Networks (CPRN) identify that there has been a recent 
decline of participation in "key democratic indicators" such as voter turnout (Abelson, Gauvin, 
MacKinnon, & Watling, 2006, p.7). Rather than demonstrating concern towards this trend, CPRN 
suggests that Canadian youth have the solution. In a document tellingly titled Youth Culture is 
Renewing Democracy, . One Click at a Time, the CPRN (2009) reassures its readers, "in our 
consultations with youth, they define political engagement in personal terms- not along party lines" 
(p.1). This reassurance is supported by Veenhof et al .'s (2008) suggestion that "traditional measures 
of civic participation, such as voting or watching the news, may not capture th[e] new forms of 
community participation and public engagement" (p.5). As a result, Veenhof et al. (2008) argue that 
statisticians must create a new measure to document political engagement 2.0. There-
conceptualizing of political engagement extends to the notion of democracy as well. In his address at 
Nielsen's Consumer 360 conference, Pankraz declared that online content creation equals the 
"democratization of creativity" (Nielsenwire, 201 Od, para. 1 0). However, as Preston (2002) cautions. 
"when we look beneath the glossy surface of such slogans to seek some enlightenment about the 
nature, direction and causes of socio-economic change ... we are generally disappointed" (p.232). 
There is great danger inherent in conflating democratic values with market values. As Ronalda 
Munck (2002) argues, 
Markets [equal] democracy only in the simplest of neoliberal economics textbooks, and 
even their representatives on Earth, such as the World Bank, now recognize the 


















the North) simply cannot be equated with democratic citizenship {p.13). 
The behavioural patterns of Generation C, while not representing a full-blown manifestation of 
marketers visions, embrace market populist conceptual systems to an alarming extent. Reversing 
the civic deficit requires recognizing how these practices support the growth and spread of the 
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